The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1994/94_172/94_172.zd

Text File | 1995-05-15 | 11.8 KB | 234 lines

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 94-172
--------
JOHN BRUCE HUBBARD, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the sixth circuit
[May 15, 1995]

  Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice
O'Connor and Justice Souter join, dissenting.
  The bankruptcy trustee objected to the discharge of
petitioner, a voluntary bankrupt, believing that he had
filed false information.  The trustee filed a complaint
under 11 U. S. C. 727, alleging petitioner stored a well-
drilling machine at his residence; petitioner answered by
denying the allegation -for the reason that it is untrue.-
App. 12, - 10.  The trustee also alleged in a separate
motion that petitioner had, despite requests, failed to
turn over all the books and records relating to the
bankruptcy estate.  Petitioner filed a response denying
the allegation, and asserting that he had produced the
requested documents at the behest of a previous trustee.
Petitioner was then indicted under 18 U. S. C. 1001,
and a jury found that each of these responses was a lie.
  Today, the majority jettisons a 40-year-old unanimous
decision of this Court, United States v. Bramblett, 348
U. S. 503 (1955), under which petitioner's conviction
plainly would have been upheld.  It does so despite an
admission that the Court's reading of 1001 in Bramblett
was -not completely implausible,- ante, at 11.  In
replacing Bramblett's plausible, albeit arguably flawed,
interpretation of the statute with its own -sound-
reading, the Court disrespects the traditionally stringent
adherence to stare decisis in statutory decisions.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172
(1989); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720, 736
(1977).  The two reasons offered by the plurality in Part
V of the opinion and the justification offered by the
concurring opinion fall far short of the institutional
hurdle erected by our past practice against overruling a
decision of this Court interpreting an act of Congress.
  The first reason is styled as an -intervening develop-
ment in the law-; under it, decisions of courts of appeals
that cannot be reconciled with our earlier precedent are
treated as a basis for disavowing, not the aberrant court
of appeals decisions, but, mirabile dictu our own deci-
sion!  This novel corollary to the principle of stare
decisis subverts the very principle on which a hierarchi-
cal court system is built.  The second reason given is
that there has been little or no reliance on our
Bramblett decision; I believe that this ground is quite
debatable, if not actually erroneous.
  Today's decision harkens to the important reason
behind the doctrine of stare decisis, but does not heed it.
That doctrine is -a basic self-governing principle within
the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the
sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving
a jurisprudential system that is not based upon `an
arbitrary discretion.'-  Patterson, 491 U. S., at 172,
citing The Federalist No. 78, p. 490 (H. Lodge ed. 1888)
(A. Hamilton).  Respect for precedent is strongest -in the
area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to
change this Court's interpretation of its legislation.-
Illinois Brick Co., 431 U. S., at 736.  Justice Brandeis'
dissenting opinion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U. S. 393 (1932), made the point this way:
-Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in
most matters it is more important that the applica-
ble rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right. This is commonly true even where the error
is a matter of serious concern, provided correction
can be had by legislation.-  Id., at 406 (citations
omitted).
  We have recognized a very limited exception to this
principle for what had been called -intervening develop-
ments in the law.-  But the cases exemplifying this
principle, e.g., Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
406 U. S. 320 (1972); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477 (1989),
have invariably made clear that the -intervening
developments- were in the case law of this Court, not of
the lower federal courts.  Indeed, in Illinois Brick Co.,
we refused to follow a line of lower court decisions
which had carved out an exception from one of our
precedents.  431 U. S., at 743-744.
  But today's decision departs radically from the previ-
ously limited reliance on this exception.  The principle
of stare decisis is designed to promote stability and
certainty in the law.  While most often invoked to
justify a court's refusal to reconsider its own decisions,
it applies a fortiori to enjoin lower courts to follow the
decision of a higher court.  This principle is so firmly
established in our jurisprudence that no lower court
would deliberately refuse to follow the decision of a
higher court.  But cases come in all shapes and variet-
ies, and it is not always clear whether a precedent
applies to a situation in which some of the facts are
different from those in the decided case.  Here lower
courts must necessarily make judgments as to how far
beyond its particular facts the higher court precedent
extends.
  If there is appeal as a matter of right from the lower
court to the higher court, any decision by the lower
court which is viewed as mistaken by the higher court
will in the normal course of events be corrected in short
order by reversal on appeal.  But in the present day
federal court system, where review by this Court is
almost entirely discretionary, a different regime prevails.
We receive nearly 7,000 petitions for certiorari every
Term, and can grant only a tiny fraction of them.  A
high degree of selectivity is thereby enjoined upon us in
exercising our certiorari jurisdiction, and our Rule 10
embodies the standards by which we decide to grant
review.  One of the reasons contained in Rule 10.1(a) is
the existence of a conflict between one court of appeals
and another.  The negative implication of this ground,
borne out time and again in our decisions to grant and
deny certiorari, is that ordinarily a court of appeals
decision interpreting one of our precedents-even one
deemed to be arguably inconsistent with it-will not be
reviewed unless it conflicts with a decision of another
court of appeals.  This fact is a necessary concomitant
of the limited capacity in this Court.
  One of the consequences of this highly selective
standard for granting review is that this Court is
deprived of a very important means of assuring that the
courts of appeals adhere to its precedents.  It is all the
more important, therefore, that no actual inducements
to ignore these precedents be offered to the courts of
appeals.  But today's decision is just such an induce-
ment; it tells courts of appeals that if they build up a
body of case law contrary to ours, their case law will
serve as a basis for overruling our precedent.  It is
difficult to imagine a more topsy-turvy doctrine than
this, or one more likely to unsettle established legal
rules which the doctrine of stare decisis is designed to
protect.
  The plurality attempts to bolster this aspect of its
opinion by blandly assuring us that -the cases endorsing
the exception almost certainly reflect the intent of
Congress.-  Ante, at 18.  Members of Congress will
surely be surprised by this statement.  Congress has not
amended or considered amending 1001 in the 40 years
since Bramblett was decided.  We have often noted the
danger in relying on congressional inaction in construing
a statute, Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. __, __ (slip
op., at 11-12) (1993), citing Schneidewind v. ANR
Pipeline Co., 485 U. S. 293, 306 (1988), but even there
the -inaction- referred to is a failure of Congress to
enact a particular proposal.  Here there was not even
any proposal before Congress.
  If we delve more deeply into the hypothetical thought
processes of a very diligent Member of Congress who
made a specialty of following cases construing 1001, the
Member would undoubtedly know of our decision in
Bramblett 40 years ago.  If he also followed decisions of
the courts of appeals, he would know that in various
forms-whether a -judicial function- exception or an
-exculpatory no- rule-several Courts of Appeals have
held 1001 inapplicable to some statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings.  If, after due deliberation,
he concluded that this exception was inconsistent with
our opinion in Bramblett, he would surely also realize
that in due course, on the assumption that the judiciary
was functioning as it should, the Supreme Court would
itself decide that the exception was inconsistent with
Bramblett, and disavow the exception.  But of one thing
he would have been in no doubt: that under Bramblett
one who lied to an officer of Congress was punishable
under 1001, since that was the precise holding of
Bramblett.  But it is that very justifiable expectation of
Congress that is set at naught by today's decision, under
which the legislative process is no longer protected by
1001.
  The plurality offers a second reason in defense of its
decision to overrule Bramblett.  It points to a lack of
significant reliance interests in Bramblett.  It dispels
any reliance prosecutors might have in enforcement of
1001 by arguing that the government has expressed a
preference for proceeding under alternative statutes that
punish comparable behavior.  U. S. Department of
Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual -9-69.267
(1992).  The Government offered a convincing explana-
tion for this preference: it instructs prosecutors to
proceed under alternative statutes due to the uncertain
mine field posed by the judicial function exception
adopted in some but not all circuits.  Brief for Petitioner
20, and n. 9.  I do not think the Government disclaims
reliance by adopting a defensive litigating strategy in
response to the choice of lower courts to disregard
precedent favorable to the Government.  And in this
particular case, the perjury alternative in 18 U. S. C.
1621 was altogether unavailable to punish petitioner's
falsehoods because his statements were not verified, and
the obstruction of justice alternative in 18 U. S. C.
1503 was of dubious utility.
  Statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts indicate that the Government has
secured convictions under 1001 in 2,247 cases over the
last five fiscal years.  Because the Administrative Office
does not break down its statistics by type of agency to
which the defendant made a false statement, further
exploration of the subject must be limited to published
decisions.  It is unclear what proportion of these cases
involved false statements made to the legislative or
judicial branch, but it appears that the Government has
attempted to proceed under 1001 for false statements
made to the judiciary and legislature with mixed
success.  To the extent it has secured valid convictions
in some courts in reliance on Bramblett, the Government
should not now be forced to endure requests for habeas
relief that will inevitably be filed in the wake of the
Court's opinion.
  The additional comments set forth in the concurring
opinion equally disregard the respect due a unanimous
decision rendered by six justices who took the same oath
of office sworn by the six justices who overrule
Bramblett today.  The doctrine of stare decisis presumes
to reinforce the notion that justice is dispensed according
to law and not to serve -the proclivities of individuals.-
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986).  The
opinion of one justice that another's view of a statute
was wrong, even really wrong, does not overcome the
institutional advantages conferred by adherence to stare
decisis in cases where the wrong is fully redressable by
a coordinate branch of government.
  This, then is clearly a case where it is better that the
matter be decided than that it be decided right.
Bramblett governs this case, and if the rule of that case
is to be overturned it should be at the hands of Con-
gress, and not of this Court.